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Close cookie message Login Alert Cancel Log in × × Home ____________________ Submit search [ ] Only search content I have access to * * Home * Log in * Register * Browse subjects * Publications * Open research * Services * About Cambridge Core * Cart * Cart * * * Institution login * * Register * Log in * * Cart Hostname: page-component-6fc99b8f77-l6vnx Total loading time: 0.245 Render date: 2023-01-04T22:23:19.625Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": false } hasContentIssue true * Home * >Journals * >Journal of Social Policy * >Volume 8 Issue 1 * >The Housewife: An Unjustified Financial Burden on the... * English * (BUTTON) Français Journal of Social Policy Journal of Social Policy __________________________________________________________________ Article contents * Abstract * References The Housewife: An Unjustified Financial Burden on the Community* Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2009 Rolande Cuvillier __________________________________________________________________ * Article * Metrics Article contents * Abstract * References Get access (BUTTON) Share (BUTTON) (BUTTON) Cite Rights & Permissions[Opens in a new window] __________________________________________________________________ Abstract This article attempts to demonstrate how the community subsidizes a married couple in which the wife stays at home, through the combined effect of tax and social security privileges. Contrary to what might be thought, this system is not even really designed to protect ‘the family’: it operates irrespective of whether there are any children or not. It is in fact intended to reward the couple in which the wife devotes herself to looking after her husband. It is quite likely that women who go out to work (and who also do their housework) bear more than their share of the cost of this, because of the ‘overpayments’ that they are obliged to make in taxation and social security contributions. I propose that the system be abolished, as it corresponds to an out-of-date concept of marriage and has no justification from either the economic or the social standpoint. A housewife receives an income from her marriage and, if she actually does the housework, she improves the couple's standard of living. A number of working hypotheses are put forward in an attempt to see how the housewife could assume the normal responsibilities of a taxpayer and social security contributor. It is impossible (a) to assess the value of the services provided by the housewife in her sheltered environment and (b) even to know for certain what she really does there (many housewives employ charwomen or au pair girls or even full-time servants). However, when it is a question of granting to a widow an income related to what she had when her husband was alive, she is entitled to a specified fraction – usually half – of what her husband received or would have received. If this principle is valid with respect to benefits, it ought also to be valid with respect to obligations. Thus, the main proposal made here is that the housewife should pay income tax and social security contributions on a fictitious amount equivalent to half of her husband's earnings; this amount would be treated as ‘earned income’, which is the most favourable assumption from her standpoint. At the same time, the husband would pay income tax and his own social security contributions on the whole of his own earned income, as he would if he employed a housekeeper. The above-mentioned fictitious amount would also serve as the basis of calculation of the housewife's entitlement to social security benefits, subject to redistribution so as to assure a minimum subsistence in case of need. Reforms along these lines could only be put into effect gradually, since it would be unjust to penalize people from one day to the next for irresponsible behaviour which they have been deliberately encouraged to adopt up to the present. __________________________________________________________________ Type Articles Information Journal of Social Policy , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , January 1979 , pp. 1 - 26 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279400008369[Opens in a new window] Copyright Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1979 Access options Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.) __________________________________________________________________ References 1 ^1 In a few cases, a widow may also enjoy some minor advantages, but these cannot be compared with the privileges enjoyed by a housewife. 2 ^2 The term ‘worker’ is used in the present article to refer only to a person who follows a trade, occupation or profession. 3 ^3 See Galbraith, J. K., Economics and the Public Purpose, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1975, ch. 4, p. 49Google Scholar, ‘Consumption and the Concept of the Household’. 4 ^4 For the purpose of simplification, no reference is made here to income from sources other than the husband. 5 ^5 This is not the case with regard to a widow's pension or a divorced wife's maintenance allowance, despite the fact that such income is merely a continuation, in another form, of the income received during marriage; only the amount may have changed. Can this be so because there is no longer a man to benefit? 6 ^6 Ferge, Zsuzsa, Women's Progress within Social Development, European Seminar on the Changing Roles of Men and Women in Modem Society: Functions, Rights and Responsibilities, Groningen, Netherlands, 28 March–5 04 1977Google Scholar, Division of Social Affairs, United Nations, Geneva, 1977, p. 8.Google Scholar 7 ^7 Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, Ottawa, 1970, pp. 293–8.Google Scholar The system was proposed in a study by a tax expert, Dr Douglas G. Hartle. 8 ^8 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Treatment of Family Units in OECD Member Countries under Tax and Transfer Systems, a report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris, 1977, pp. 51 and 65.Google Scholar 9 ^9 In some countries, it seems normal to include in taxable income the estimated value of another type of income in kind, namely, housing provided free of cost by the employer. 10 ^10 Hughes, Percy F. (ed.), Daily Mail Income Tax Guide 1976–1977, Associated Newspapers Group, London, table showing tax payable on specimen incomes (all earned), pp. 120–1.Google Scholar 11 ^11 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1976 Federal Income Tax Forms, 1976 tax table, pp. 26–8Google Scholar; and 1976 tax rate schedules, p. 29. The comparison is between the single taxpayer and the married couple filing joint returns. To add another example, in France, in 1977, the difference in tax paid could amount to 2,100 francs on a taxable income of 24,000 francs and 10,600 francs on 100,000 francs – Guide Pratique du Contrbuable 1977, Syndicat National Unifié des Impôts, Paris, 1977, pp. 151 and 159.Google Scholar 12 ^12 Toch, Henry, Income Tax, eighth edition, M. and E. Handbooks, MacDonald and Evans, London, 1975, pp. 18–19Google Scholar (Toch's quotation marks). 13 ^13 This penalization takes two main forms; either the wife's earnings are added to those of her husband and are thus taxed at a higher rate than would be justified if they were taxed separately, or else the earnings of the husband and the wife are taxed separately but at the higher rate, which is that generally applied to the earnings of single people at the same level of income. A man whose wife has no outside employment is in the last analysis the only beneficiary of the regime theoretically established for ‘married people’. A few countries have eliminated differences in tax rates and levels of taxable income based on marital status. In Great Britain, there is a difference in the personal allowance deductible from taxable income, which is higher for the ‘married man’; in addition, when she receives earned income, a married woman is granted a lower earned income relief than her husband. For a very interesting study on the subject in Great Britain, see Equal Opportunities Commission, Income Tax and Sex Discrimination. Manchester, 1977.Google Scholar 14 ^14 In this connection, see Polsky, E. Vogel, Report on Social Security for Non-gainfully employed Women in Council of Europe Member States, Council of Europe, Committee of Social Security Experts, fortieth session, 2–6 07 1973, Strasbourg, 1973Google Scholar; and Grounin, M., Social Security Issues Affecting Women, International Labour Office, Committee of Social Security Experts, Geneva, 26 November–3 01 1975Google Scholar, Geneva, 1975. A resolution on social security for women at home was adopted in 1975 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 250th meeting of ministers' deputies, Resolution 75:28. 15 ^15 This proposal was put forward by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, along with another proposal under which credits earned by the spouse at work would be split between both spouses. 16 ^16 See Clark, J. I., ‘Adapting Social Security Programmes to Provide Income Support for Spouses not in the Labour Force (with Particular Reference to Canada)’, in International Social Security Association, Women and Social Security, Studies and Research no. 5, Geneva, 1973, pp. 85–102.Google Scholar 17 ^17 Income Security for Older Women: Path to Equality, report by the Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment of the Select Committee on Aging, ninety-fourth Congress, first session, December 1975, Washington, 1976, pp. 4–5 and 8–9.Google Scholar 18 ^18 Laroque, Pierre, ‘Women's Rights and Widows' Pensions’, International Labour Review, 106:1 (1972), 1–10.Google Scholar In Canada, according to amendments to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) proposed by the government, a contributor who leaves the labour force to raise children under the age of seven would be allowed to ‘drop out’ such periods from the calculation of his or her lifetime earnings for CPP benefit purposes. 19 ^19 See Hawrylyshyn, Oli, ‘The Value of Household Services: A Survey of Empirical Estimates’, in International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, The Review of Income and Wealth, Income and Wealth Series 22, no. 2, New Haven Connecticut, 1976, pp. 101–31.Google Scholar 20 ^20 See ‘The New Housewife Blues’, Time, 14 March 1977, p. 46.Google Scholar 21 ^21 This difference was observed by the Federal Insurance Company for Salaried Employees in Berlin – life expectation for working women was 68.5 years, while for the country as a whole the average life-span of women (economically active and inactive) was 73.5 years. According to the same statistics full-time women employees had a life-span lower than that of full-time male employees by several years; a degree of equality between the sexes appeared only in a comparison between full-time male employees and part-time female employees. 22 ^22 ‘Quel Age Atteindrez-Vous?’, Flair (Zurich), Editions Albis, 7–8 July 1977, pp. 58–60Google Scholar – adaptation to the situation in Switzerland of data established by Dr Diana S. Woodruff of Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 23 ^23 In making such a balance sheet, many other factors should be taken into consideration, including the effects of the ceiling on the income-base of social security contributions, which especially affects the lower earnings of women workers; the importance of contributions paid by women without corresponding benefits; and the extra cost to health insurance funds due to the fact that women (including housewives) in certain age groups consult their doctors more often than men, and so on. 24 ^24 Example quoted in European Trade Union Confederation, Livre Blanc des Travailkuses: Femmes au Travail, Brussels, 1976, pp. 168–9.Google Scholar 25 ^25 Hoskins, Dalmer, ‘Women and Social Security: Study of the Situation in Five Countries’, International Social Security Review, Year 26, nos 1 and 2, 1973, pp. 75–84.Google Scholar 26 ^26 It is, of course, assumed that the wife is able to work. 27 ^27 See Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families, Vol. 2, Department of Health and Social Security, Cmnd 5629, HMSO, London, 1974, pp. 67–71Google Scholar – Appendix 3, ‘Income Maintenance for One-Parent Families in Other Countries’, an appraisal by Christine Cockburn and Hugh Heclo. As stated by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, ‘It is illogical to attach the lower [tax] exemption to the child who unquestionably requires services of a high value and so is properly classed as a dependant and … the higher exemption to the wife at home who unquestionably supplies services and so should not be included in the dependant class. In all justice the married status exemption should not be given when there is no dependant in the family … A childless couple has the right to decide that the wife will devote all her time to homemaking but there is no reason why the State should attach an advantage to this choice by giving the husband a married status exemption’ – Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, p. 299.Google Scholar This would be valid also for any household in which children no longer require day-care. 28 ^28 Certain researchers include in this income the value of leisure, which raises the standard of living. 29 ^29 For a recent account of the numerous studies on the evaluation of housework, see interalia United Nations, Economic Statistics, System of National Accounts and Balances: The Feasibility of Welfare-Oriented Measures to Complement the National Accounts and Balances, Report of the Secretary General, Economic and Social Council, Statistical Commission, Part II, nineteenth session, New Delhi, 8–19 November 1976.Google Scholar 30 ^30 Housewives and the Economy, Supplement to World Young Women's Christian Association, Women and the Economy, Geneva, 1976, p. 3.Google Scholar 31 ^31 See Nordström, Margareta, ‘Social Home Help Services in Sweden’, International Labour Review, 88:4 (1963), 366–79Google Scholar; and, in the United Kingdom, An Experiment in Salaried Chilaminding, Inner Area, Lambeth (the Groveway Project), report by the consultants, Department of the Environment, London, 05 1977.Google Scholar There are examples of organizing various services and facilities for day-to-day living in housing developments in a number of countries. 32 ^32 The proposal could be construed as establishing an automatic correspondence between a housewife, on the one hand, and the cost of looking after children in the absence of the parents, on the other hand; it is based on the above-mentioned confusion arising from the attempt to justify the privileges granted to a housewife on the ground of the existence of children. 33 ^33 More or less everybody would receive it, except the housewife, who would not be entitled to it since she would not be employed outside the home. But she would become entitled to it on reaching the normal age of retirement. 34 ^34 See Cockburn, Christine and Hoskins, Dalmer, ‘Social Security and Divorced Persons’, International Social Security Review, Year 29, 1976CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hoskins, Dalmer, Problems of Divorce for Social Security Policy: ISSA Inquiry on Social Security and Divorced Persons, International Social Security Association, Round Table Meeting on Social Security Provisions in Case of Divorce, mimeograph, Geneva, 29 June – 1 07 1977.Google Scholar In the Federal Republic of Germany couples divorcing after 1 July 1977 share on an equal basis all the pension credits which have been accumulated at the time of divorce by either spouse during the years of marriage; pension credits are assigned on that basis to the account of the wife who has not been employed. As the scheme is earnings-related, the future old-age pension of the divorced husband will in this case undergo a corresponding reduction. A similar system of splitting pension credits has been proposed by the Canadian government. 35 ^35 For the purpose of simplification, only the working spouse's occupational earnings are taken into account. But it would also be possible to consider both the earned and the unearned income of the working spouse. This would have an impact on benefits as well as on obligations to pay. 36 ^36 The spouse who remains at home only half time and is employed during the other half of the time would be deemed to have an income corresponding to the addition of his or her earnings from outside work and 25 per cent of the other spouse's earnings. 37 ^37 This would also imply, of course, that the person at home would not be presumed to have 50 per cent of the spouse's earnings for purposes of social security entitlements, according to the principle that what one accepts as a beneficiary one should also accept as a payer. 38 ^38 It should be recalled that this value is only half of that of the total housework performed, since half of the housework is for the benefit of the spouse at home and should not be paid for by the working spouse. 39 ^39 Wilder, Thornton, Our Town, The Skin of my Teeth, The Matchmaker, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974 – ‘The Matchmaker’, Act I, p. 194.Google Scholar 40 ^40 Galbraith, op. cit. pp. 46–7. 41 ^41 If this approach were chosen, the couple in which both spouses work outside the home should be treated as having a total income of the household equal to their joint earnings, each paying taxes separately on half of that total. (Housework should not be considered in the case of such a couple, as is explained on p. 24.) This would retain the principle of income-splitting as it is applied in some countries for tax purposes, but without the fake distinction between ‘one-earner’ and ‘two-earner’ couples and without the present penalization of some married couples because the wife works outside the home. 42 ^42 We have not considered, for example, the consequences of the new system proposed from the point of view of benefits accruing to possible beneficiaries other than the spouse; the methods of financing social benefits; or the types of social security systems involved. 43 ^43 In addition, the new system proposed seems more just for the working spouse than the recent measures or proposals (see footnote 34) which deprive him or her of part of the fruit of his or her own labour by requiring that half of his or her social security contri butions should be credited to the spouse at home. 44 ^44 For example, if the income enjoyed by the person at home is assumed to be half of the other spouse's earnings, any substitute income which would be guaranteed under the social security scheme would normally be only a portion of that income – probably equivalent to around 25 per cent of the spouse's earnings. Voluntary insurance could ensure that such a portion is supplemented in order to guarantee to the person at home a substitute income equal to half of any substitute income of the working spouse. If the person at home is assumed to have half of a total income of the household, equal to 150 per cent of the working spouse's earnings, each of them could have social security entitlements based on half of that total; the working spouse would have an entitlement based on less than 100 per cent of the fruit of his or her own labour. 45 ^45 Brunet, Eric, ‘Problems of Introducing Equality for Women’, The Times, 16 04 1977, p. 16.Google Scholar 8 Cited by Cited by Loading... (BUTTON) __________________________________________________________________ Cited by * Crossref logo 8 * Google Scholar logo Crossref Citations Crossref logo This article has been cited by the following publications. 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Ageing and Society, Vol. 13, Issue. 3, p. 297. * CrossRef * Google Scholar __________________________________________________________________ Cuvillier, Rolande 1993. Equality of Treatment for Housewives in Tax and Benefit Systems: A Proposal. Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 22, Issue. 4, p. 439. * CrossRef * Google Scholar __________________________________________________________________ Ginn, Jay 2003. Parenthood, Partnership Status and Pensions:. Sociology, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 493. * CrossRef * Google Scholar __________________________________________________________________ Bergmann, Barbara R. 2005. The Economic Emergence of Women. p. 133. * CrossRef * Google Scholar __________________________________________________________________ Bonnet, Carole and Hourriez, Jean-Michel 2012. Égalité entre hommes et femmes à la retraite : quels rôles pour les droits familiaux et conjugaux ?. 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